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Who or What Really Counts in a Firm’s Stakeholder Environment: 




Following the line of thinking that a firm is a nexus of contracts between stakeholders, with 
managers as “the central node” (Hills and Jones, 1992), this study examined how managers 
prioritize stakeholder relationships and to what extent firms engage in voluntary disclosure 
with the stakeholder group they deem to be important. Data was simultaneously collected 
from two different national business contexts, Italy and the US.  Results of the study show 
that the power, legitimacy, and urgency that managers associate with various stakeholder 
groups cumulatively determine how they go about prioritizing competing stakeholder claims. 
The results also provide evidence to the effect that the more importance a firm attaches to a 
stakeholder group, the greater the level of interaction between the firm and the stakeholder 
group, as evidenced in the information reported by the firm in its disclosures. 
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Stakeholder management is generally viewed as a partnering between the firm and 
who the firm considers to be its stakeholders, and involves “communicating, negotiating, 
contracting, and managing relationships” (Freeman, 2004: 237).  It is commonly accepted that 
managers of a firm play a somewhat unique role in stakeholder management, often being the 
only group to make strategic decisions involving the allocation of the limited resources of the 
firm in a manner that they perceive to be consistent with the stakeholder claims (Greenlay, 
Hooley, Broderik and Rudd, 2005; Hills and Jones, 1992). But while most scholars accept the 
pragmatic reality that in this “partnering”, managers cannot attend to all of the actual and 
potential claims of all the stakeholders (Harrison and St John, 1994), the issue of to “whom or 
what” do managers pay attention and how do they go about making this determination,   3
continues to be debated (e.g. Bowie, 1988; Clarkson, 1995; Cornell and Shapiro; 1987;  
Freeman and Reed, 1983; Freeman, Wick and Parmar, 2004; Greenley, Hooley, Broderick 
and Ruud, 2004; Hills and Jones, 1992; Jones, Felps and Bigley, 2007; Nasi, 1995; Polonsky 
and Scott, 2005; Unerman and Bennett, 2004). 
Freeman’s definition of a stakeholder as “any group or individual who can affect or is 
affected by the achievement of the organization’s objectives” is largely agreed and widely 
cited, however it offers an extremely wild field on the possibility as to who or what really 
counts prioritizing stakeholder claims and designing the relational strategy.    
More recently, Mitchell, Agle, and Wood (1997) proposed a theory of stakeholder 
salience to explain the conditions under which managers pay attention to certain classes of 
stakeholders and how they prioritize stakeholder relationships. They posit that stakeholder 
identification and salience is a function of managers’ perceptions of stakeholders as 
possessing one or more relationship attributes: the stakeholders’ power to influence the firm, 
the legitimacy of stakeholders’ relationship with the firm, and the urgency of stakeholders’ 
claim on the firm.  The stakeholder salience theory, as such, attempts to explain the dynamics 
inherent in the complex considerations that determine to whom and to what managers actually 
pay attention when managing their stakeholder groups (Agle, Mitchel and Sonnenfeld, 1999). 
Accordingly, stakeholders groups are here discussed referring to salient key stakeholders 
which contribute to the company’s long term and sustainable competitive advantage (Epstein, 
2000).   
Developing an understanding of why managers pay attention to certain stakeholder 
groups also sets the stage for an examination of how and to what extent firms engage with 
various stakeholder groups.  It appears logical that the more importance a firm attaches to a   4
stakeholder group, the higher will be the level of interaction between the firm and the 
stakeholder group and the more will be the stakeholder dialogues addressing the interests of 
the group.  Although firms employ a variety of communication mechanisms in their attempt to 
reach and engage stakeholders, voluntary disclosures are a cornerstone of stakeholder 
dialogue largely emphasized by stakeholder reporting literature (Lev, 1992; Epstein and 
Birchard, 2000; Preston, Donaldson and Brooks, 1999, ) as well as by international regulators 
and professional bodies (GRI, 2006; ISEA, 1999, FASB, 2000, OECD, 2001) .  As such, 
numerous and prestigious research reports encourage firms to make increased efforts to 
communicate their engagement initiatives, through voluntary disclosures, toward the 
stakeholder groups that they consider to be salient. 
 
Objectives of This Study 
Following the line of thinking that a firm can be viewed as a nexus of contracts 
between stakeholders, with managers as “the central node” (Hills and Jones, 1992), this study 
first examines the extent to which the power, legitimacy, and urgency that managers associate 
with various stakeholder groups, determines how managers go about prioritizing competing 
stakeholder claims.  Next, the study examines if and to what extent firms engage in a dialogue 
with the stakeholder group they deem to be important, as reflected in the voluntary disclosures 
made by the firm.  The Financial Accounting Standard Board (FASB, 2000) describes 
“voluntary disclosures” as “information primarily outside of the financial statements that are 
not explicitly required by accounting rules or standards.”   Recent guidelines provided by 
FASB have encouraged companies to engage in disclosures in excess of the requirements   5
including accounting and other information that managers of a company deem relevant to the 
needs of various stakeholder groups (Meek et al., 1995).   
Relatively little research exists on the managers’ attitude toward voluntary disclosure 
related to stakeholder groups (Core, 2000; Healy, 2001).  It has been frequently discussed that 
techniques such as the “identification of key stakeholders” (E&Y, KPMG and PWC, 1999; 
GRI, 2003) should be performed in order to guide voluntary disclosure practices of 
companies.  But in absence of empirical evidence to support these assertions, voluntary 
disclosure practices of companies continue to be studied largely from the perspective of 
disclosed information (output) rather than investigating the process that managers adopt in 
designing the institutional dialogue toward stakeholder groups.  
In this paper it is argued that since companies are known to treat stakeholder reporting 
as the key to building, sustaining and continually refining stakeholder engagement (Ruth and 
York, 2004; E&Y, KPMG and PWC, 1999; Roberts, 1992), the greater the salience attached 
to a stakeholder group, the greater the effort the firm will make to address the demands of the 
stakeholder group and communicate its efforts via voluntary disclosures.  Such an approach is 
based on past literature that indicates that voluntary disclosures are an important part of the 
dialogue between management of the firm and its stakeholders (Ballou, Heitger, Landes and 
Moss, 2006; Hooks, Coy and Howard, 2002; Verrecchia, 2000; Guthrie and Parker, 1990;). 
Finally, in examining these relationships, the study acknowledges the fact that 
stakeholder attributes, like the ones examined in this study, are social perceptual phenomena 
(Palmer and Quinn, 2005; Smith, Adhikari and Tondkar, 2005) which are socially 
constructed, not objective reality, and are influenced by a manager’s value systems.  Also, 
researchers have also tried to account for the differences observed in voluntary disclosures   6
across different national contexts (Boesso and Kumar, 2007; Brennan, 2001; Zazeski, 1996) . 
The extant literature is equivocal of the effects of  legal and competitive environments on 
disclosure practices of company, while little and mixed evidence is provided about the 
influence of factors such as the managers’ value system. Accordingly, it seems imperative that 
factors identified the stakeholder prioritization process are examined in more than one 
national context to ascertain their applicability across countries.  
Since this study aims to analyze the general implementation of stakeholder theories, 
the choice of managers from Italy and the US appeared particularly appropriate as the 
regulators bodies of both countries support voluntary disclosures and the Geert Hofstede 
cultural indicators show only little differences among the two countries. While the common 
emphasis on transparent communication is clear referring to the national legislation for the 
listed companies (recently Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the US and the so called “Saving Law” in 
Italy), common cultural effect is a multi-dimensional and complex construct. However, the 
Hofstede indicators are widely adopted in stakeholder reporting research (Smith et al, 2005; 
Wall, 2005) as valid proxy for the influence of cultures on management behavior.   As such, 
the stakeholder management framework proposed in this study is tested across two different 
country contexts, Italy and the United States trying to validate the general applicability of the 
stakeholder salience and the stakeholder reporting theories.   
 
Theoretical Framework for the Study 
More than two decades after the publication of the landmark work of Freeman, 
“Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach” (1984), scholars are still debating some of   7
the fundamental questions related to stakeholder theory.  Who is a stakeholder? What is a 
stake? And which groups of stakeholders deserve management attention and which do not? 
The Broad and the Narrow View of Stakeholders 
There is much disagreement on what kind of entity can be considered as a stakeholder.  
One of the broadest definition in the literature is the now classic definition by Freeman 
(1984:46) which defines stakeholders of an organization as, “any group or individual who can 
affect or is affected by the achievement of an organization’s objectives.”  The rationale behind 
such a comprehensive identification of stakeholder is to enable managers to recognize and 
effectively respond to a disparate set of entities.  Such broad view of stakeholders is firm-
centered, in the sense that managers might want an exhaustive list of stakeholders in order to 
evaluate various claims and interests with the purpose of firm’s survival, economic well 
being, damage control and taking advantage of opportunities (Atkinson A., 1997; Savage, 
Nix, Whitehead and Blair, 1992).   
The narrow view of stakeholders also defines stakeholders in terms of their necessity 
for the firm’s survival, but defines the groups in terms of their “direct relevance to the firm’s 
core economic interest” (Clarkson, 1995; Brenner, 1993).  This view of stakeholder 
management is based on the practical reality of resource and time limitations and cognitive 
constraints faced by managers in dealing with disparate demands from the environment. 
While the narrow view of stakeholder looks at these groups in terms of their direct relevance 
to the firm’s core economic interests, the broad view is based on the reality that firms interests 
can be affected by almost anyone who can affect or is affected by the objectives of a firm.    8
Stakeholder Salience Theory 
Although stakeholder theorists continue to differ considerably on whether to take a 
broad or a narrow view of the firm’s stakeholders (Freeman et al, 2004: Sundaram and 
Inkpen, 2004), Mitchell et al (1997) offer a “bridging concept” to overcome the situation.  
They suggest that “the broad concept of stakeholder must be better defined in order to serve 
the narrower interests of legitimate stakeholders” (p. 862).  From their review, they conclude 
that while the broad view emphasizes the stakeholders’ power to influence the firm’s 
behavior, the narrow view emphasizes the claim’s legitimacy based upon contract, exchange 
and at-risk status.   
Agle et al (1999) argue that the prioritization that managers accord to the interests of 
various stakeholder groups will be based on managerial perceptions of power, legitimacy and 
urgency.  Resource dependency theory suggests that the power differential among 
stakeholders is the outcome of the fact that power accrues to those groups who control 
resources required by the firm (Pfeffer, 1981).  Hence, the more critical the resource 
controlled by a stakeholder group, the greater the importance the firm will accord to that 
group. In particular, it is assumed that stakeholder power exists where one social actor, A, can 
get another social actor, B, to do something that B would not have otherwise done (Agle at 
all, 1999).   Legitimacy is, “a generalized perception or assumption that actions of an entity 
are desirable, proper or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, 
and beliefs” (Suchman, 1995).  Finally, urgency is “the degree to which stakeholders’ claim 
calls for immediate attention”.  It includes time sensitivity—the degree to which managerial 
delay in attending to stakeholder is unacceptable—and criticality—the importance of the 
claim to stakeholder.  It is the managers of a firm who determine which stakeholder groups   9
are salient to the firm (those who will be accorded high prioritization by the firm), and this 
evaluation is based on managers’ perception of the degree to which stakeholder groups 
possess the aforementioned attributes (Agle et al, 1999).  
Stakeholder Reporting Theory 
Although stakeholder management is complex mix of different strategic approaches 
(communicating, negotiating, contracting and managing the relationship), the demand for 
enhanced disclosures, better communication and improved stakeholder dialogue has been 
fueled by the increasing popularity of the stakeholder approach that has resulted in a 
widespread realization that the interactions of a company are not limited to just shareholders.  
European research centers such as the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD, 2001), the Association of Chartered Certified Accountant (ACCA, 
1999) and the Institute for Social and Ethical Accounting (ISEA, 1999) have each attempted 
to develop voluntary disclosure frameworks as they relate to corporate governance structure, 
social accounting and stakeholder reporting.  Similarly, the Center for Social and 
Environmental Accounting Research (CSEAR), the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) and the 
Institute for Social and Ethical Accountability (ISEA) have also examined the relationship 
between corporate voluntary disclosure and sustainable development of a company’s business 
activities.  The Triple Bottom Line (TBL) reporting framework (ISEA, 1997) has proposed 
integrated reporting in terms of three different measures of value added, economic, 
environmental, and social.  Also, the Business School of Copenhagen in collaboration with 
Ernst & Young (1999), KPMG and other auditing firms, has developed a management guide 
to stakeholder reporting focusing on interest and influence of each group. Hence, voluntary 
disclosures should be designed according to stakeholder claims and be viewed as part of the   10
more general stakeholder management strategies. Furthermore, the above mentioned literature 
supports and/or proposes techniques of stakeholder “mapping” and stakeholder “matrix” in 
order to better define which groups should be targeted by the company institutional reports. 
Only “key salient stakeholder” are highlighted as important by the framework presented and 
they emerge among the many as the stakeholder better connected with the long term and 
sustainable competitive advantage of the company. 
 
Hypothesis 
Who Counts in a Firm’s Stakeholder Environment 
As noted above, the stakeholder salience theory proposes that the degree to which 
managers give priority to competing stakeholder claims is dependent on the managerial 
perception of the possession of the attributes of power, legitimacy and urgency.  The 
determination of a stakeholder possessing these attributes is, as such, a socially constructed 
and not objective reality.  The stakeholder salience theory does not argue that managers 
should pay attention to a certain stakeholder group, it simply posits that because of perceptual 
factors managers do pay certain kinds of attention to certain kinds of stakeholders (Mitchell et 
al, 1997). It is therefore hypothesized that: 
  H1:  There will be a difference in the managerial perceptions of power, legitimacy and 
urgency associated with various stakeholder groups. 
 
The salience that a firm’s managers associate with a stakeholder group is a matter of 
multiple perceptions since stakeholder salience—the degree to which managers give priority 
to competing stakeholder groups—is the result of cumulative stakeholder attributes of power,   11
legitimacy and urgency perceived by managers to be present. In addition, these attributes 
create greater salience in combination than based on their individual presence.  For example, a 
stakeholder group may possess the power to impose their will upon a firm but if they do not 
possess legitimacy or urgency, the overall saliency will remain inconsequential in eliciting 
response from the firm.  But when power is combined with legitimacy, the stakeholder group 
becomes capable of forming coalitions and makes its influence on the firm felt in a much 
more pronounced way.  Similarly, power when combined with urgency can create a 
stakeholder group capable of using coercive means to gain management attention. Managers 
will, therefore, perceive a group with combination of attributes to be more salient and would 
want to achieve certain ends and pay particular kinds of attention to these stakeholder groups.  
It is therefore hypothesized that: 
H2:  The greater the managers perception of the presence of power, legitimacy and 
urgency in the demands of a stakeholder group the greater will be the salience 
associated with the stakeholder group. 
 
What Counts in A Firm’s Stakeholder Environment 
Manager’s perceptions of stakeholders’ attributes not only form the critical variables 
in dictating stakeholder salience, they are also crucial in determining organizational resource 
allocation in response to stakeholder claims (Agle et al, 1999).  It is the managers’ 
responsibility to reconcile divergent interests by making strategic decisions to allocate 
resources in a manner that is most consistent with the claims of various stakeholder groups 
(Hills and Jones, 1992:134).  Thus the stakeholders that win the management’s attention will 
be only those that the managers perceive to be highly salient.   12
Viewing the identification of key stakeholders as a strategic plan by a firm to manage 
stakeholder relations (Roberts, 1992), one can expect management of a firm to target only 
specific groups and selected claims. Studies that have examined voluntary disclosures made 
by companies unequivocally show that companies direct their dialogue and reporting efforts 
towards “key stakeholders”—those stakeholders that are perceived to be important and have 
influence on firm activities (Smith, Adhikari and Tondkar, 2005; Core, 2000). Researchers 
have also noted differences in the disclosure policies, disclosure patterns and disclosure 
choices of companies, based on their identification and prioritization of various stakeholder 
groups (Eccles , Herz, Keegan, and Philips, 2001; Epstein and Birchard, 2000). Stakeholder 
dialogue, as such, is the cornerstone of stakeholder engagement (Unerman and Bennett; 
2004).  It is therefore hypothesized that: 
H3:  The greater the perceived salience of a stakeholder group by a firm, the greater 
will be the firm’s stakeholder engagement effort directed at that group (as 
evidenced in the voluntary disclosures made by the company). 
 
Method  
The sample for this study consisted of 244 managers. 133 of the managers were from 
the US and 114 were from Italy (Appendix).  The decision to collect data from two different 
country contexts was prompted by the fact that differences in the social perceptual phenomena 
like power, legitimacy, and urgency (which form the core of the stakeholder saliency theory) 
are more pronounced in a cross-country context and societal value systems could influence 
the importance a firm attaches to the claims of different stakeholder groups.  In addition, 
voluntary disclosures, which are used in the study to examine managerial response to each of   13
the stakeholder groups, is known to vary across country contexts (Boesso and Kumar, 2007; 
Smith, Adhikari and Tondkar, 2005, Palmer and Quinn, 2005).  Furthermore, testing the 
framework created for this study in two similar national business context will contribute to the 
robustness of findings of the study. 
The choice of Italy and the US was based on the fact that both are economically 
developed countries that, according to the well known Hofstede cultural dimensions 
(Hofstede, 1998), show high levels of individualism (Italy: 76 vs. US: 91) and uncertainty 
avoidance (70 vs 62) and a low level of power-distance (inequality) score (50 vs 40). As such, 
both cultures seem to show appreciation for individual rewards and policies; rules and clarity 
and equal opportunity to discuss different opinions. The only arguable difference in their 
societal values is represented by the masculinity index which is slightly higher in Italy (75 vs 
46).  In relation to voluntary disclosure this means that a focus on discussing the 
performances without taking into account the well-being of the actors concerned can work 
counter-productive (Waal, 2005) because the core value of a masculine society is winning, 
while low masculinity implies an emphasis on equality, solidarity and consensus. 
Data was collected in form of an anonymous questionnaire, which was administered 
while these managers were attending management programs. In each of the two country 
settings, the managers who responded to the survey represented samples across multiple 
industries.  Collecting data from more than one industry allowed us superior generalizability 
of the findings of the study.  
Data was collected in reference to five different stakeholder groups that are common 
to most companies in most industries. In making the choice of stakeholder groups, the study 
followed the framework suggested by Clarkson (1994) who has conceptualized two broad   14
categories of stakeholders. Voluntary stakeholders are those that bear some form of risk as a 
result of having invested some form of capital, human or financial, or something of value in a 
firm.  Involuntary stakeholders are those who may be placed at risk as a result of firm’s 
activities, but without the element of risk.  Expanding the generic stakeholder groups 
proposed by Freemans (1984) and adopted by Agle at all (1999): Financial community, labor 
union and customer groups were used as representatives of the first groups, while, 
environmental advocacy groups and professional industry groups were included as 
representatives of the second group.  
To measure the salience of various stakeholder groups, managers were asked to 
evaluate the pressure that their company faced from each of the five stakeholder groups on a 7 
point Likert type scale. As previously operationalized by Mitchell at all. (1997) and Agle at 
all. (1999) multiple items were developed for measuring each of the salience theory constructs 
trough survey prototypes and CEO interviews. The list of the proposed items is available in 
the appendix of their published research and the actual items used for this paper were picked 
by that list and presented to managers together with the following recommended examples. 
Power: the stakeholder group has the ability to apply a high level of direct economic reward 
or punishment and management perceives this pressure. Legitimacy: the group’s claim are 
viewed by the management team as proper and appropriate and accordingly treated as a threat 
or an opportunity for the company. Urgency: the group is active in pursuing claims – demands 
or desires – that are perceived as very important by the company which is actively engaged 
with the group. Finally, managers were asked to indicate the extent to which their firms was 
addressing the concerns of each stakeholder group as evidenced in the voluntary disclosures 
made by firms.     15
  In designing the questionnaire particular attention was paid to the potential for bias 
resulting from response artifacts (Podsakoff and Organ, 1986).  First, the order of questions 
was randomized to avoid any response-order biases. Second, variation was made in the 
wording and anchors associated with the scale used to measure different constructs.   
 
Results 
  Data was analyzed in three separate stages.  First the correlation of all variables was 
calculated.  The correlation matrix was closely examined for any evidence of multicolinearity. 
This was a potential concern since all of the data for the study was collected from the same 
source.  However, there was no evidence of multicolinearity, as all the variables that were 
correlated were meaningfully related and there was no significant correlation among unrelated 
variables. Table 1 presents the complete correlation matrix. The upper diagonal of the matrix 
presents the results of the US sample while the Italian sample is presented in the lower 
diagonal.   
-- Insert Table 1 here -- 
Next, Analysis of Variance was employed to examine the differences in the 
managerial perceptions of power, legitimacy and urgency across the five different stakeholder 
groups. Separate analysis was conducted for the US and the Italian sample.  Significant 
differences were found in the managerial perceptions of power, legitimacy and urgency across 
the five stakeholder groups for both the US (Table 2) and the Italian (Table3) sample.  This 
confirmed hypothesis 1, which predicted that differences will exist in the managerial 
perceptions of power, legitimacy and urgency across different stakeholder groups. 
-- Insert Table 2 here--   16
Before proceeding with further data analysis it was felt important to determine the 
similarities and differences in the results of the two samples. If no significant differences were 
to exist between the two samples, they could be combined for further data analysis.  Despite 
the overall communalities highlighted by the Hofstede cultural indexes, T-tests conducted to 
compare the perceptions of power, legitimacy and urgency reported by the US and the Italian 
managers across the five stakeholder groups showed significant differences for several 
stakeholder groups. For example, while the Italian managers perceived labor unions to be 
possessing the greatest power and urgency and professional and industry groups to be 
possessing greatest legitimacy, the US managers perceived financial community to be 
possessing the greatest power and, professional and industry group to be possessing the 
greatest urgency and the greatest legitimacy.  These results are not reported because they are 
beyond the objectives of this study, but they did confirm the need to proceed with further data 
analysis with two separate samples and highlight a new potential research line investigating 
the reasons of these differences.   
Next, salience of each stakeholder group was calculated by multiplying the reported 
attributes of power, legitimacy and urgency.  Calculating salience in this manner closely 
follows the stakeholder salience theory framework, which conceptualizes these attributes to 
be interacting with each other in determining the firm’s response to the stakeholder groups 
(Agle et al, 1999).   Analysis of variance tests were then conducted to examine differences in 
the salience associated with the five stakeholder groups.  In the US, managers reported 
financial community as the most salient stakeholder group (mean=70.56) and the labor union 
as the least salient stakeholder group (mean=18.19).  The Italian managers, as well, perceived 
the financial community as the most salient stakeholder group, but their saliency was not as   17
strong as the US (mean 44.58 vs. 70.56).  Customer advocacy group was perceived as the 
least salient stakeholder group (mean=16.53) by the Italian managers.  Results of the tests (for 
both the US and the Italian sample) presented in Table 4 show that managers are quite 
discriminating in the salience they associate with various stakeholder groups.  These results 
served as confirmation of hypothesis 2. 
-- Insert Table 3 and Table 4 here-- 
Next, to examine the relationship between stakeholder salience and firm’s response to 
the five stakeholder groups, two subgroups were created for each stakeholder group by 
splitting the sample based on the median salience score.  The group with higher than the 
median salience score were labeled as high salience group, and those with below median 
salience score were labeled as low salience group.  Finally, ten sets of Analysis of Variance 
tests were done, one for each of the five US stakeholder groups and one for each of the five 
Italian stakeholder groups. The dependent variable was voluntary disclosures.  Hypothesis 3 
had predicted that managers would pay more attention to and attend to a highly salient 
stakeholder group as opposed to groups with low saliency, as evidenced by the stakeholder 
engagement efforts reported in the voluntary disclosures made.  Results of ANOVA generally 
confirmed the hypothesis.  However, there were some exceptions in the results of both the 
Italian and the US sample, possible explanations for which are discussed in the following 
section. 
--Insert Table 5 and Table 6 here-- 
The last step in the data analysis was aimed at a closer examination of why managers 
respond to each stakeholder group the way they did.  As noted several time in this study, the 
potential relationship between a firm and a group of stakeholder is dependent on stakeholder   18
salience, which is the outcome of the managerial perception of the power, legitimacy and 
urgency associated with the stakeholder group.  Given the time, energy and resource 
constraints, managers may well do little or even nothing about stakeholders they perceive to 
be possessing only one of these attributes.  However the combination of two attributes (as 
noted earlier in the paper) leads to a changed dynamics with a corresponding increase in 
firm’s responsiveness to the stakeholder group (Mitchell et al 1997).   
Following the above reasoning stakeholder attributes were examined in combination 
in terms of their effect on the level of engagement between firm and the stakeholder groups.  
Results presented in Table 7 and Table 8 show that the combination of power and legitimacy 
is the strongest predictor (as indicated by the standardized coefficient of the variable in the 
regression equation) of the level of engagement between firm and the stakeholder, while the 
combination of legitimacy and urgency is the weakest.  This is generally true about most of 
the stakeholder groups, both in Italy and in the US.  More detailed discussion relating to these 
findings and their implications are discussed in the next section. 
--Insert Table 7 and Table 8 here-- 
 
Discussion 
  The aim of this study was to empirically examine the extent to which the stakeholder 
salience and the stakeholder reporting theories determine prioritization of competing 
stakeholder claims in two national context.  Furthermore, the study investigated if and to what 
extent stakeholder salience was crucial in determining the firm behavior with respect to 
various stakeholder groups.  Results of the study confirm that across Italy and US the 
prioritization accorded by a company to the demands of various stakeholder groups is based   19
on managers’ perception of three stakeholder attributes—power, legitimacy and urgency.  
However, results also showed that more important than the possession of one or the other 
attribute is the cumulative effect of the possession of attributes in determining how managers 
prioritize stakeholder relationships. The results also provide evidence to the effect that the 
more importance a firm attaches to a stakeholder group, the more is the level of interaction 
between the firm and the stakeholder group, as evidenced in the levels of engagement 
reported by the firm in its voluntary disclosures. 
  The most obvious conclusion that one can draw from this study is that managers of a 
firm do not accord all stakeholders the same level of importance. This is evident from the 
significant differences in the power, urgency and legitimacy that they associate with various 
stakeholder groups and the relative salience they attach to each of the stakeholder groups.  
However, considering the fact that the two national context analyzed presented similar legal 
& cultural framework but report different key stakeholders, in the prioritization accorded by a 
firm to the interests of various stakeholder groups, the perspective of managers seems to play 
a critical role.  To the extent that managers are known to vary in their environmental scanning 
(Daft, Sormunen and Park, 1995) and their values (Frederick, 1995; Hambrick and Mason, 
1984), these managerial characteristics act to moderate the stakeholder-firm relationships.  
With manager at the center of the nexus to effect reconciliation among stakeholders (Hills and 
Jones, 1992), decisions about which groups of stakeholders to address also seems to be 
dependent on the individual managers’ behavior. Differences in the salience that Italian and 
US managers associate with different stakeholder groups are perhaps indicative of the cultural 
and behavioral aspects of a particular orientation toward each stakeholder group rather than 
referring to the overall national culture framework as reported by Hofstede indexes.   20
  The variation in salience — the relative degree of importance that managers attach to 
different stakeholder groups — also appears to dictate the level of interaction between a 
stakeholder group and the firm.  Firms generally seem to be making greater efforts to reach 
out and engage in dialogues with stakeholder groups to whom they accord high salience.  
However, results also show occasional incongruence between the salience that managers 
associate with a stakeholder group and the level of engagement effort that they report as being 
devoted to that group.  For example, despite the higher salience associated with the 
Professional industry group, Italian managers reported giving relatively low managerial 
attention to this group.  Similarly, the US managers reported relatively good levels of 
engagement aimed at the Customer group, despite the fact that they accorded lower salience 
to this group.  Such differences are perhaps indicative of the fact that managers have “limited 
ability to attend to all problems simultaneously,” (Cyert and March, 1963:43). In addition to 
that, one could asserts that professional and institutional bodies’ recommendations on the 
importance of the “individuation of key stakeholders” prior to the voluntary disclosure 
exercise are somewhat largely distended by the practitioners that perceive the salience of 
specific groups without disclosing.  
Finally, results of this study also seem to suggest that to whom and to what managers 
pay attention in managing different groups of stakeholders is a pragmatic exercise.  
Stakeholder demands are in a variable and not steady state, and so are the stakeholder 
attributes.  The circumstances which determine a firm’s level of engagement toward a 
stakeholder group appear to be strongest when all of the three attributes—power, legitimacy 
and urgency—are present.  The presence of power and legitimacy and power and urgency 
together also appears to elicit greater stakeholder dialogue aimed at addressing the interests of   21
a group. Professional and institutional bodies could build on these results better coordinating 
their reporting framework with the stakeholder salience’s determinants. 
As for the limitations of this study, perhaps the most major limitation of this study 
stems from the manner in which data was collected.  Self-report measures, although widely 
used in behavioral and strategy research, raise doubts about the findings. While the use of 
self-reported measures for managerial perception about stakeholder salience is justified, one 
would have ideally liked to collect data about stakeholder dialogue and engagement efforts 
through archival or other sources. 
 
Contributions of this Study and Future Research Directions   
  The main contribution of this study lies in empirically testing and extending an 
inferential theory of stakeholder management.  To the extent that this study highlights the 
unique role that managers play in managing firm-stakeholder relationships, future study need 
to more closely and systematically examine the moderating role of managerial values, 
attitudes and beliefs in managing stakeholder relationships.  The study also presents some 
evidence to the effect that the attributes outlined in the stakeholder salience theory are liable 
to vary across cultures.  As such, further test of the theory in cross-cultural situations is 
desirable.  Finally, managerial actions and behaviors, as reflected in the stakeholder 
management efforts reported in voluntary disclosures, is an essential and important aspect that 
this study has added to the stakeholder salience theory.  Future researchers could focus on 
examining this specific aspect utilizing a variety of measures.  This is particularly important 
because in recent years stakeholder dialogue employing means of communication, such as   22
voluntary disclosures, has been deemed to be the cornerstone of effective stakeholder 
management (GRI, 2006; Unerman and Bennett, 2004).   
 
Managerial Implications 
  Findings of this study have major implications for the practice of effective stakeholder 
management.  In an era when firms are increasingly relying on the commitments of various 
stakeholder groups to create value, focusing attention on management-stakeholder 
relationship holds the key to more effective management.  The stakeholder salience theory as 
tested in this study offers some practical insights into the understanding of which stakeholders 
do really matter and why.  Furthermore, in relating stakeholder salience to a firm’s 
stakeholder engagement efforts, this study highlights the limitations that managers may face 
because of their own cognition, values and beliefs in determining a particular orientation 
toward a stakeholder group.  It is only when managers are able to systematically evaluate 
which groups of stakeholders deserve or require management attention can they formulate 
effective strategies to bring a core group of stakeholders together and allocate the limited 
resources of the firm in a manner most consistent with the demands of various stakeholder 
groups.  






Italy   lu_P fc_P ecg_P cag_P pig_P lu_U  Fc_U ecg_U cag_U pig_U lu_L  fc_L  ecg_L cag_L pig_L  lu_D  fc_D  ecg_D cag_D pig_D 
                         
lu_P 1  .24
B  .18 .11 .01 .05 .04 .01 .04 .11 .11  .07 .05 .04 .12 .50
B .15  .10  .03  .02 
fc_P  .00  1  .16 .09 .10 .07 .09 .10 .01 .10 .03  .19
B .08  .07  .07  .09  .66
B .10  .18  .09 
ecg_P  .10 .13 1  .13 .10 .01 .10 .09 .14 .05 .02  .13 .12 .07 .09 .14 .10 .69
B .20
C .10 
cag_P  .02 .16 .13  1  .10 .05 .11 .07 .04 .01 .09  .01 .05 .28
B .15  .12  .14  .11  .66
B .13 
pig_P  .14 .01 .01  .13  1  .04 .04 .01 .10  .27
B .04 .01  .06  .10  .31
B .09  .14  .14  .12  .63
B 
lu_U  .06 .02 .12  .03  .08  1  .07 .02 .07 .05 .17  .11 .12 .08 .06 .11 .12 .09 .01 .01 
fc_U  .05 .13 .09  .06  .08  .10  1  .12 .02 .05 .13  .19
C .16  .11  .07  .06  .11  .07  .15  .03 
ecg_U  .05 .00 .02  .05  .11  .11  .12  1  .16 .13 .02  .05 .13 .04 .11 .11 .03 .07 .05 .14 
cag_U  .05 .08 .02  .12  .05  .12  .16  .17 
C  1  .11 .04  .08 .04 .04 .10 .12 .01 .12 .08 .13 
pig_U  .06 .03 .04  .12  .21
C .11  .10  .12  .13  1  .10 .09  .15  .01  .32
B .16  .05  .11  .03  .21
C 
lu_L  .06 .14 .05  .06  .02  .25
B .16  .10    .12  .07  1  .13 .11 .05 .00 .24
B .02  .02  .11  .04 
fc_L  .11  .03  .01 .11 .08 .06 .03 .12 .05 .02 .02  1  .13 .15 .11 .01 .35
B .03  .06  .09 
ecg_L  .12 .01 .24
C  .04 .02 .12 .02 .17 .03 .02 .12  .06 1  .14 .13 .07 .11 .18
C .12  .09 
cag_L  .09 .03 .04  .19
C .10  .12  .04  .17    .10  .03  .19
C .15  .10  1  .13 .04 .12 .10 .19
C .02 
pig_L  .14 .04 .07  .08  .20
C   .15  .07  .17   .06  .01  .09  .10  .15  .15  1  .12 .14 .03 .08 .20
C 
lu_D  .12  .08  .18 .04 .12 .05 .03 .14 .03 .15 .20
C .06  .05  .16  .01  1  .16 .14 .18
C .11 
fc_D  .18 .50
B  .16 .04 .03 .04 .04 .16 .00 .01 .11  .26
B .09  .09  .04  .01  1  .12 .13 .11 
ecg_D  .06 .10    .37
B  .06 .07 .05 .01 .10 .17 .02 .07  .07 .10 .07 .04 .05 .13 1  .16 .11 
cag_D  .03 .04 .17  .49
B  .18 .00 .16 .01 .04 .15 .12  .02 .02 .15 .14 .13 .09 .14 1  .12 
pig_D  .06 .02 .13  .18  .49
B  .05 .10 .13 .04 .02 .15  .00 .02 .16 .24
C .08  .11  .02  .11  1 
                         
 
P: Power, U: Urgency; L: Legitimacy, D: Disclosure  
lu: labor union; fc: financial community; ecg: environmental and community groups; cag: customer advocate groups; pig: professional industry groups. 
B: p<0.01; C: p<0.05 
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Table 2 
Differences in Attributes across Stakeholder Groups (U.S. n=130) 
 
    
STAKEHOLDER GROUPS 
 































  Std. Dev.  (2.04)  (2.06)  (1.99)  (2.07)  (1.76)   
Urgency  Mean 2.938  4.338  4.185  4.053  4.769  23.22  *** 
  Std. Dev.  (1.55)  (1.75)  (1.68)  (1.57)  (1.49)   
Legitimacy  Mean 2.938  4.615  4.261  4.338  4.800  20.50  *** 
  Std. Dev.  (1.91)  (1.80)  (1.96)  (1.82)  (1.72)   
          




Differences in Attributes across Stakeholder Groups (Italy n=114) 
 
    
STAKEHOLDER GROUPS 
 































  Std. Dev.  (1.65)  (2.01)  (1.94)  (1.54)  (1.63)   
Urgency  Mean  3.105  2.053  2.421  2.737  2.263    2.90 * 
  Std. Dev.  (2.88)  (2.29)  (2.56)  (2.73)  (2.46)   
Legitimacy  Mean 2.000  4.667  2.912  2.930  4.702  49.59  *** 
  Std. Dev.  (1.17)  (1.90)  (1.89)  (1.97)  (1.99)   
             
*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; *p<0.05.   19
Table 4 
Differences in Salience of Stakeholder Groups (U.S. and Italy) 
 
   STAKEHOLDER  GROUPS   































(n=130)  Std. Dev.  (29.02)  (101.86)  (76.51)  (60.15)  (87.08)   
Salience IT  Mean 28.798  44.579  18.333  16.526  30.351  5.10  *** 
(n=114)  Std. Dev.  (35.63)  (75.17)  (44.10)  (37.56)  (62.05)   
*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; *p<0.05. 
 
Table 5 
Differences in Voluntary Disclosures across Stakeholder Groups (U.S. n=130) 
 



















VD with low  Mean 1.901  4.526  2.789  3.280  2.798 
salience  Std. Dev.  (1.27)  (2.13)  (1.76)  (2.03)  (1.51) 
  N 91.  93.  95.  93.  89. 
VD with high  Mean 3.700  6.105  4.611  3.316  4.476 
salience  Std. Dev.  (2.15)  (1.45)  (2.13)  (2.05)  (1.93) 
  N  39.    37.     35.   37.   41. 
F    35.52 ***   17.45 ***    24.81 ***    0.00  29.39 *** 
*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; *p<0.05; 
 
Table 6 
Differences in Voluntary Disclosures across Stakeholder Groups (Italy n=114) 
 



















VD with low  Mean 3.872 3.471  2.620  1.720 1.840 
salience  Std. Dev.  (1.81)  (1.82)  (1.87)  (1.26)  (1.16) 
  N 77.  69.  78.  74.  68. 
VD with high  Mean 4.243 4.867  3.278  2.550 2.956 
salience  Std. Dev.  (1.36)  (2.01)  (1.52)  (1.60)  (1.49) 
  N 37.  45.  36.  40.  46. 
F     1.22  14.89 ***   3.41 *   9.36 **  20.32 *** 
*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; *p<0.05.   20
Table 7 
Determinants of Voluntary Disclosures (U.S. n=130) 
 
    






























  Std. Error  (5.72)  (8.96) (8.66)  (5.90)  (5.48) 
Power*Urgency  Coefficients  .19 *  .28 *  .29 ***  .43 ***  .36 ** 
  Std. Error  (2.38)  (2.34) (2.92)  (4.28)  (2.47) 
Legitimacy*Urgency  Coefficients  .03  .31 *  .34 ***  .28 ***  .36 ** 
  Std. Error   (.41)  (2.48)  (3.51)  (2.90)  (2.64) 
Adj. R
2   .25  .44  .45  .36  .31 
F    15.74 ***  34.67 ***  35.92 ***   24.82 ***   20.17 *** 
 
*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; *p<0.05.  
 
Table 8 
Determinants of Voluntary Disclosures (Italy n=114) 
 
    






























  Std. Error  (2.39)  (6.29) (2.53)  (4.60)  (4.94) 
Power*Urgency  Coefficients .21  .02  .30  *  .10  .15 
  Std. Error  (1.60)  (.24)   (2.29) (1.01)    (1.27) 
Legitimacy*Urgency  Coefficients .09  .13  .30  *  .10  .25  * 
  Std. Error  (.74)  (1.10)  (2.29)   (1.02)      (2.29) 
Adj. R
2   .04  .25  .09  .17  .24 
F    2.58 * 13.78 ***   4.58 **  8.93 ***  12.83 *** 
           
*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; *p<0.05. 




Surveys’ respondents  ITALY  US 
  Number  % of total  Number  % of total 
> 10 years of work experience  21 18.42 24  18.46 
> 7 years of work experience  34 29.82 34  26.15 
> 4 years of work experience  33 28.95 51  39.23 
> 2 years of work experience  26 22.81 21  16.16 
Tot.  114 100 130  100 
Financial services industry  17 14.91 21  16.15 
Industrial manufacturing  45 39.47 64  49.23 
Information and communication  18 15.79 20  15.38 




This stakeholder group has the ability, whether used or not, to apply a high level of direct economic 
reward or punishment (money, goods, services, etc.) to obtain its will:              
           (1=very little, 3=somewhat, 5= quite a bit 7= a lot) 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 ,7  
 
This stakeholder group is active in pursuing claims (demands, desires) which it feels very important:     
           (1=very little, 3=somewhat, 5= quite a bit 7= a lot) 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 ,7 
 
The claim of this particular stakeholder group are viewed as proper and appropriate by managers 
operating in our industry:    
         (1=very little, 3=somewhat, 5= quite a bit 7= a lot) 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 ,7 
 
This stakeholder group receive high priority in the stakeholder engagement efforts (such as dialogue 
and voluntary disclosure) of the companies operating in our industry:  
     (1=very little, 3=somewhat, 5= quite a bit 7= a lot) 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 ,7 
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